We propose a formal framework for intelligent systems which can reason about scientific do mains, in particular about the carcinogenicity of chemicals, and we study its properties. Our framework is grounded in a philosophy of sci entific enquiry and discourse, and uses a model of dialectical argumentation. The formalism en ables representation of scientific uncertainty and conflict in a manner suitable for qualitative rea soning about the domain.
INTRODUCTION
We seek to build intelligent systems which can reason au tonomously about the risk of carcinogenicity of chemicals, drawing on whatever theoretical or experimental evidence is available. In earlier work (McBurney & Parsons 1999) , reviewing the literature on methods of carcinogen risk as sessment, we listed the different types of evidence adduced to support these claims, which may be in the form of: ex perimental results on tissue cultures, animals or human epi demiological studies; analytical comparisons with known carcinogens; or explication of biomedical causal pathways. Evidence from these different sources may conflict, and carcinogen risk assessment usually involves the compar ison and resolution of multiple evidence (E.P.A. U.S. A 1986; Graham, Green, & Roberts 1988) . In representing this domain, it therefore seems appropriate to use some form of argumentation (so that the reasons for claims can be represented in association with the claims themselves), and within a dialectical framework (so that cases for and against a particular claim can be compared). In particular, dialectical argumentation enables the representation of un certainty in the underlying scientific knowledge base. This paper presents such a dialectical formalism for an intelli gent system, which we termed a Risk Agora in our earlier work. We begin by examining the nature of scientific dis course.
SCIENTIFIC DISCOURSE

A MODEL OF SCIENTIFIC ENQUIRY
Our chosen application domain is a scientific one. To repre sent this domain, therefore, we seek to ground our formal ism in a philosophical model of scientific enquiry. Firstly, we require a theory of the nature of modem science. Fol lowing Pera (1994) , we view the enterprise of science as a three-person dialogue, involving a scientific investiga tor, Nature and a skeptical scientific community. In Pera's model, the investigator proposes theoretical explanations of scientific phenomena and undertakes scientific experiments to test these. The experiments lead to "replies" from Na ture in the form of experimental evidence. However, Na ture's responses are not given directly or in a pure form, but are mediated through the third participant, the scien tific community, which interprets the evidence, undertakes a debate as to its meaning and implications, and eventually decides in favor or against proposed theoretical explana tions. The consequence of this model for our formalism is that we provide Nature with a formal role, but manifest it through those of the other participants.
But Pera's model of modem science as a dialogue game could apply to many other human dialogues, most of which do not share science's success in explaining and predict ing natural phenomena. Our model of science therefore requires an explanation of its success. Some philosophers of science believe this is due to the application of univer sal principles of assessment of proposed scientific theo ries, such as the falsificationism of Popper or the confir mationism of Camap. However, we do not share these views, instead believing, with Feyerabend (1993) , that the standards of assessment used by any scientific community are domain-, context-and time-dependent. This view, that there are neither universal nor objective standards by which scientific theories can be judged, was called "epistemolog ical anarchism" by Lakatos (Lakatos & Feyerabend 1999) . Instead of universal principles of assessment of theories, we believe science's success arises in part from applying two normative principles of conduct: firstly, that every the-oretical explanation proposed by a scientific investigator is contestable by anyone; and secondly, that every theoretical explanation adopted by a scientific community is defeasi ble. In other words, all scientific theories, no matter how compelling, are always tentative, being held only until bet ter explanations are found, and anyone may propose these.1
To build an intelligent system based on these principles, we therefore require a (normative) model of scientific discourse which enables contestation and defeasibility of claims. Our model has several components. At the high est level, we are attempting to model a discourse between reasonable, consenting scientists, who accept or reject ar guments only on the basis of their relative force. An in fluential model for debates of this type is the philosophy of Discourse Ethics developed by Habermas ( 1991) for de bates in ethical and moral domains. Our formalism there fore draws on Habermas, in particular his rules of discourse first fully articulated by Alexy (1990) , and these form the basis of the desired properties of the Agora formalism pre sented later in this section.2 Next, within this structure, we wish to be able to model dialogues in which different participants variously posit, assert, contest, justify, qualify and retract claims. To rep resent such activity requires a model of an argument, and we use Toulmin's (1958) model, within a dialectical frame work. To embody our belief in epistemological anarchism, we permit participants to contest any component of a sci entific argument: its premises; its rules of inference (Toul min 's "warrants"); its degrees of support (his "modalities"); and its consequences. We believe this is exactly what real scientists do when confronted with new theoretical expla nations of natural phenomena (Feyerabend 1993) . When a scientific claim is thus contested, its proponent may re spond, not only by retracting it, but by qualifying it in some way, perhaps reducing its scope of applicability. Naess ( 1966) called this process "precizating", and we seek to enable such responses in the system. We thus ground our formalism for the Agora in a model of scientific discourse as dialectical argumentation. 3
DESIRED AGORA PROPERTIES
As mentioned, we desire our Agora formalism to satisfy the rules for a reasoned discourse proposed by Alexy (1990) , which are listed here. In restating these, we have modi fied and re-ordered them slightly, and have ignored rules which deal specifically with discussion of ethical matters. Also, because our formalism is intended for debate regard ing only one chemical at a time, we have ignored Alexy's 1 These two principles are each necessary to explain science's success, but not sufficient. rules regarding the relevance of utterances. We have also added a property concerning precization.
Pl Anyone may participate in the Agora, and they may execute dialogue moves at any time, subject only to move-specific conditions (defined below).
P2 Participation entails acceptance of the semantics for the logical language used, and of the associated modality (degrees of support) dictionaries.
P3 Any participant may assert any claim or consequence of a claim, but may do so only when they have a grounded argument for the claim (respectively, a con sequential argument from the claim).
P4 Any participant may question or challenge any claim or any consequence of a claim.
PS Any participant who asserts a claim (respectively, a consequence of a claim) must provide a valued grounded argument for that claim (respectively, a val ued consequential argument from the claim) if queried or challenged by another participant.
P6 Any participant may question or challenge the grounds, the rules of inference or the modalities for any claim.
P7 Whenever a participant asserts a valued grounded argu ment for a claim (or a valued consequential argument from a claim), any other participant may assert a val ued grounded argument (respectively, a valued conse quential argument) for the same claim with different dictionary values.
PS A participant who has provided a grounded argument for a claim which has been challenged should be able to respond by qualifying (precizating) the original claim or argument.
P9
Any participant who provides a grounded argument for, or a consequential argument from, a claim is not required to provide further defence if no counter arguments are provided by other participants.
PlO No participant may contradict him or herself.
3 THE RISK AGORA FORMALISM
PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS
We begin by assuming the system is intended to represent debate regarding the carcinogenicity of a specific chemi cal, and that statements concerning this can be expressed in a propositional language £, whose well-formed formu lae (wffs) we denote by lower-case Greek letters. Subsets of £ (i.e. sets of wffs) are denoted by upper-case Greek letters, and £ is assumed closed under the usual connec tives. We assume multiple modes of inference (warrants) are possible, these being denoted by 1-i . These may include non-deductive modes of reasoning, and we make no pre sumptions regarding their validity in any truth model. We assume a finite set of debate participants, denoted by Pi. who are permitted to introduce new wffs and new modes of inference at any time. We denote Nature, in its role in the debate, by PN . Definition 1: A grounded argument for a claim 0, de noted A( -+ 0), is a 3-tuple (G,R,O), where G = (0o, 01, 81,02, ... , 0n-2, On-1, 0n-1) is an ordered se quence of wffs ()i and possibly -empty sets of wffs 0i , wi th n � 1 and wi th R = (h, h, ... , 1-n) an ordered sequence of inference rules such that:
In other words, each () k ( k = 1, ... , n -1) is derived from the preceding wff ()k_1 and set of wffs 0k-1 as a result of the application of the k-th rule of inference, 1-k. The rules of inference in any argument may be non-distinct. We call the set {Ok-1} u 0k_1 the grounds (or premises) for Ok.
, is a 3-tuple (0, R, C), where C = (0o, 01, 81, 02, ... , 0n-2, On-1, 0n-1, On) is an ordered se quence of wffs ()i and possibly -empty sets of wffs 0i , wi th n � 1, and wi th R = (l-1, h, ... , 1-n) an ordered se quence of inference rules such that:
On-1, 0n -1 1-n On.
In other words, the wffs ()k in C are derivations from () arising from the successive application of the rules of in ference in R, and we call each ()k in C a consequence of 0.
In order that participants may effectively state and con test degrees of commitment to claims, we require a com mon dictionary of degrees of commitment or support (what Toulrnin called "modalities"). Our formalism will support any agreed dictionary, whether quantitative (such as a set of probability values or belief measures) or qualitative (such as non-numeric symbols or linguistic qualifiers), provided there is a partial order on its elements. We define dictionar ies for modalities for claims, grounds, consequences and rules of inference.
Definition 3: Four modality dictionaries are defined as fol lows , each being a (possibly infinite) set of elements having a part ial order . The claims dictionary is denoted by Vc, the grounds dictionary by Va, the consequences dictionary by VQ, and the inference dictionary by VI.
Because claims, grounds and consequences are all elements of the same language .C, two or more of the dictionaries Vc, Va and VQ may be the same. However, a distinct dictionary will generally be required for VI. 4 Because of our belief in epistemological anarchism, we do not specify rules of assignment of dictionary labels by participants in the Agora. In particular, the labels assigned to the conclu sions and consequences of arguments are not constrained by those assigned to premises or rules of inference.
The generic argumentat ion di ct ionary defined for assessment of ri sk by ( K rause et al. 1998 ) is an exam ple of a l i nguist ic di ct ionary for statements about claims , grounds or consequences , comprising the set: {Certain, Confirmed, Probable, Plausible, Supported, Open}. The elements of this di ct ionary are l i sted in descending order, wi th each successive label indicat ing a weaker bel ief in the claim .
Example 2: Two examples of Inference Di ct ionaries are VI= {Valid, Invalid} and VI= { Acceptable, Sometimes Acceptable, Open, Not Acceptable}.
, where ( G, R, 0) is a grounded argument for () and D (do,d1, ... ,dn-1,do,r1,r2, ... ,rn) is an ordered se quence of labels and vectors of labels , wi th each di a vector of di ct ionary labels from Vc (fori = 0, . . . , n -1), wi th do E Vc and wi th ri E VI (fori = 1, ... , n). Each vector di comprises those values of the Claims Di ct ionary assigned to grounds { ()i} u 0i , the element do is that value of the Claims Di ct ionary assigned to () and each element ri is that value of the Inference Di ct ionary assigned to 1-i . A valued consequential argument from a claim 0, denoted A(() --+,D), is defined si milarly .
DISCOURSE RULES
We next define the rules for discourse participants, building on the definitions above. Moves are denoted by 2-ary or 3-ary functions of the form name(Pi: . ), where the first argument denotes the participant executing the move. If the move responds to an earlier move by another participant, that earlier move is the second argument. Arguments are separated by colons. In Section 4, we will show that these rules give operational effect to the Desired Properties. where(} E £ and de E Vc, which informs the Agora that Pi has a valued grounded argument for(}, and has assigned it a modality of de.
1.3 Assert Claim: Any participant Pi at any time may assert a claim with move:
where (} is a wff and de E Vc, which informs the Agora that Pi has a valued grounded argument for (}, which she believes is compelling.
1.4 Query Claim: Whenever a propose or assert move relating to ((},de) has been made by participant Pi . any other participant Pi may move:
or query(Pj :a ssert(Pi: (O,de))).
These ask participant Pi to provide her valued grounded argument for 0, which she must provide im mediately with move:
show_arg(Pi : A(---+ 0, D)). which asks the Agora if there is a consequential argu ment from 0.
1. 7 Propose Consequence: Similarly to Propose Claim , a participant may move:
where ¢ is a consequence of 0.
1.8 Assert Consequence: Similarly to Assert Claim , a participant may move:
1.9 Query Consequence: Similarly to Query Claim , a participant may move:
query_cons(Pj :p ropose(Pi: (0, ¢, d¢))) .
1.10 Show Consequential Argument: Any participant Pi may at any time provide a valued consequential argu ment from 0 with the move:
show_cons ( where I-t is a mode of inference and r t E V 1. This move informs the community that participant Pi be lieves that I-t is a mode of inference of strength at least T t.
Note that the query and assertions rules are not symmet ric between grounded and consequential arguments; partic ipants may only propose or assert claims for which they have grounded arguments, but they need not necessarily have considered the consequences of these claims. Next, we explicitly define the Contest Claim rule, with other con testation rules being defined similarly. For brevity in the following, we sometimes write A for A(---+ (},D). contesLinf(Pj :s how... arg(Pi : A : f-t )).
Contest Modality:
contest.mod(Pj :s how... arg(Pi : A(--+ B, D))).
Contest Consequence:
contesLcons(Pj :s how_cons(Pi : A: (Bt, do,))). This move is identical with the sequence:
show..arg(Pj : A(--+ B, D)). Likewise, for those claims by others accepted by Pi .
Accept Asserted
No contradiction:
Any participant Pi who asserts (or accepts an assertion for) (} may not at any time subse quently assert (or accept an assertion for) -.(}, unless they have in the interim moved:
retract(Pi :a ssert(Pi : ( (}, do))) (or, respectively, its equivalent for accepted claims).
DIALOGUE RULES
Definition 5: A Dialogue is a finite sequence of di scourse moves by part icipants in the Agora , in accordance wi th the rules above.
As in (Hamblin 1971 or their equivalents, then the tuple ((), do) is inserted into CS (Pi). Whenever participant Pi executes a retraction move for ((), do) , the tuple ((), do) is removed fromCS (Pi). Similarly, whenever Pi executes a Change Modality move for ((), do) , the value of ((), do) in C S ( P i) is revised.
We next define an analogous concept for Nature, with claims inserted into Nature's Commitment Store on the ba sis of the debate at that point in the Agora. This could be achieved in a number of ways. For example, a skeptical community could define Nature's modality for a claim() to be the minimum claim modality assigned by any of those Participants claiming or supporting (). A credulous com munity could instead assign to Nature the maximum claim modality assigned by any of the participants to e. Varia tions on these approaches could utilize majority opinion or weighted voting schemes.
Because we wish to model dialectical discourse, we have instead chosen to assign Nature's modalities on the basis of the existence of arguments for and against the claim.
To do this, we draw on the generic argumentation dictio nary for debates about carcinogenicity of chemicals pre sented in (Krause et al. 1998) , which is based on Toulmin 's (1958) schema. We begin by defining certain relationships between arguments and then the Claims Dictionary for Na ture.
Definition 8: Let A(-t ()) = (G,R,()) and B(-t ¢>) = (H, S, ¢>) be two arguments , where G (eo,e1, e1, ()2, ... ,()n-1, en-d· We say that B(-t ¢>) re buts A( -t ()) if¢> = ..., ()_ We say that B( -t ¢>) undercuts A(-t () ) if,for somea E eou{el}ue1u{e2}u ... uen-1 > a= •¢>.
Definition 9: The claims dictionary for Nature is the set Vc,N = {Certain , Confirmed , Probable , Plausible , Sup ported , Open}.
Definition 10: The commitment store of Nature, denoted CS(PN) , is a non-empty set{(e, do,N) I () E £, do,N E Vc,N } . Each do,N is the claim modal ity assigned by the Agora community on Nature's behal f to () , in accordance wi th the next two rules.
Rule 5: Nature's Modalities: The modality do,N of Na ture for the claim () is assigned as follows:
• If () is a wff for which no grounded argument has yet been provided by a participant, then do,N is assigned the value Open.
• If() is a wff for which at least one grounded argument has been provided by a participant, then do,N is as signed the value Supported .
• If() is a wff for which a grounded and consistent argu ment has been provided by a participant, then do,N is assigned the value Plausible .
• If () is a wff for which a grounded and consistent ar gument has been provided by a participant, and for which no rebutting arguments have been provided, then do,N is assigned the value Probable.
• If () is a wff for which a grounded and consistent ar gument has been provided by a participant, and for which neither rebutting nor undercutting arguments have been provided by participants, then do,N is as signed the value Confirmed.
• If () is a logical tautology, then do ,N is assigned the value Certain.
Rule 6: Nature Commitment Store Update: The entries in CS(PN) are updated after each legal move by Agora participants.
ARCHITECTURE AND USER INTERFACE
We anticipate the Risk Agora system being used to rep resent a completed or on-going scientific debate, but not in real-time. Once instantiated with a specific knowledge base in this way, the Agora could be used for a number of differ ent purposes, which led us (McBurney & Parsons 1999) , to propose a layered architecture for the Agora, corresponding to these different functions. The main purposes to be ful filled are: (a) automated reasoning to find arguments for, and the consequences of, particular claims; (b) compari son of the various arguments for and against a claim; and (c) development of an overall case for a claim, coherently combining all the arguments for and against it.
AGORA PROPERTIES
The rules defined in the previous section were intended to operationalize the desired Agora properties of Section 2.2. We now verify that this is indeed the case. Theorem I: The Agora sy stem defined in Sect ion 3 has Propert ies P 1 through P 10.
Proof. This is straightforward, from the definitions of the permitted moves. Thus, Properties Pl and P2 are fulfilled through the overall system design; Property P3 by Rules 1.1-1.3 and 1.6-1.8; Property P4 by Rules 1.4, 1.9, 2.1 and 2.5; Property P5 by Rules 1.2, 1.3, 1.5, 1.7, 1.8 and 1.10; Property P6 by Rules 2.2-2.4; Property P7 by Rules 3.1-3.5; Property P8 by Rule 3.6; Property P9 by Rules 1 and 2; and Property PlO by Rule 3.8.
0
Moreover, we can use the definition of the claim modalities for Nature provided by Rule 5 to construct a valuation func tion on wffs and to define a notion of "proof" of claims, as follows.
Definition 11: Natural valuation is a funct ion v N defined from the set of wffs of C to the set {0, 1 } , such thatv N(B) = 1 precisely when do,N = Confirmed; otherwise , vN(B) = 0. Definition 12: A provisional proof for a claim B is a grounded and consistent argument for B for which neither rebuttal nor undercutt ing arguments exist.
Our belief in the defeasibility of all scientific claims leads us to use the term "provisional proof" rather than "proof." Likewise, we can think of a natural valuation equal to 1 as signifying "Currently Accepted as True" (or "Defeasibly True") and 0 as "Not Currently Accepted as True." Our definition of natural valuation thus says that a claim is de feasibly true iff there are no arguments attacking it. We could readily define additional valuation functions which capture degrees of conviction regarding the truth of claims, mapping, for instance, to Pr obable or to Plausible. With the definitions above, we can now prove soundness of pro visional proofs in the Agora, with respect to the natural valuation function. Theorem 2: Wi th the not ion of provisional proof, the Agora is consistent and complete wi th respect to the Natural Val uat ion Funct ion v N, provided that all grounded arguments for claims are eventually asserted by some Pa rt icipant. Proof. Consistency here says that all claims B for which there exists a provisional proof are also assigned a valu ation of 1 by the function VN. Completeness says, con versely, that all claims B which are assigned a valuation of 1 by v N also have a provisional proof. Both of these follow from our definitions of v N and of provisional proof, unless a consistent grounded argument for a claim B exists but is not asserted by any Participant.
The model of science we have adopted asserts that scien tific claims are regarded as "defeasibly true" only when the relevant scientific community agrees to so regard them.
(After all, even if a transcendent truth exists, science has no privileged means of accessing it.) Our definition of nat ural valuation is in effect a proxy for the scientific commu nity's opinion on the truth of a claim. Accordingly, The orem 2 says that the provisional proof procedure neither under-generates nor over-generates defeasibly true claims, provided all grounded arguments for claims are eventually asserted.
EXAMPLE
To illustrate these ideas we present a simple and hypothet ical example of an Agora debate. In a real debate, partic ipants would be free to introduce supporting evidence and modes of inference at any time. For reasons of space, in this example we first list the statements and modes of inference to be asserted, labeled Kl through K4, and Rl through R3, respectively, about a chemical X:
Kl: X is produced by the human body naturally (i.e. it is endogenous).
K2: X is endogenous in rats.
K3: An endogenous chemical is not carcinogenic.
K4:
Bioassay experiments applying X to rats result in sig nificant carcinogenic effects.
Rl (And Introduction): Given a wff ¢ and a wff B, we may infer the wff ( ¢ 1\ B).
R2 (Modus Ponens): Given a wff ¢ and the wff (¢-+B), we may infer the wff B.
R3: If a chemical is found to be carcinogenic in an ani mal species, then we may infer it to be carcinogenic in humans.
We now give an example of an Agora dialogue concern ing the statement: X is carcinogenic to humans , which we denote by ¢. The moves are numbered Ml, M2, .. . , in sequence, and for simplicity we assume the participants are using the claims dictionary of Example 1, abbreviated to { Cert , Conf, Prob , Plaus , Supp , Open} , and the in ference dictionary V1 = {Val, Inval}. Before any dis course move is made, Nature's modality for this claim is dq,,N = O pen, as is its modality for •¢. Ignoring claims about any other chemicals, we thus have at commencement thatCS(PN) = {(¢,0pen),( • ¢ , 0pen)}. Through the dialogue, we show the contents of Nature's commitment store as it changes, in steps numbered NCSO, NCSl, .. .
Ml: assert(P1 : (¢,Con!)).
M2: query(P2 : assert(P1 : (¢,Con!))).
M3: show.... arg(P1 : (K4, R3, ¢, ( Conf, Val, Con!))).
NCSl: CS(PN) ={(¢, Con!), (•¢, Op en)}.
M4: contest(P2 :assert(P1 : (¢, Con!))).
M5: query(P3 :contest(P2 :assert(P1 : (¢;,Con!)))) 
DISCUSSION
Characterization of scientific discourse as dialectical argu mentation is not new. Rescher ( 1977) claims to have been the first to propose a dialectical framework for modeling the progress of scientific inquiry, and Pera's (1994) work is also a dialectical approach to science. Among argumen tation theorists, Freeman (1991) also discusses scientific discourse in his study of argument structure. Both Carlson (1983) and Walton and Krabbe (1995) aim to model generic dialogues, but their focus is (respectively) on question-and answer and persuasion dialogues. In addition, neither for malism explicitly permits degrees of support for commit ments to be expressed, which our formalism does.
None of these works appears intended for encoding in in telligent systems. Within AI, intelligent systems for scien tific domains have used argumentation for some time (e.g. Fox, Krause, & Ambler 1992) . However, these applications have typically involved monolectical rather than dialectical argumentation. More recently, Haggith (1996) developed a dialectical argumentation formalism and applied the re sulting system to a carcinogenicity debate. However, the primary focus of her work was on knowledge representa tion in generic domains of conflict, and so her formalism is not grounded in an explicit philosophy of science. The work of Amgoud, Maudet, & Parsons (2000) is closest in approach to that presented here (and we have drawn upon their formalism), but it is focused on negotiation dialogues, agam m a generic context. Their formalism only permits two participants, although this would be relatively easy to amend. As with Haggith's system, their formalism does not permit debate over the rules of inference used. Recent legal argumentation systems, such as those of Verheij ( 1999) , do permit this.
Our formal definition of the Risk Agora enables contes tation and defeasibility of scientific claims. Our system therefore operationalizes the two normative principles of conduct for scientific discourses presented in Section 2.1. We are currently exploring a number of refinements to the Agora. Firstly, Rehg ( 1997) has demonstrated the ratio nality of incorporation of rhetorical devices (such as epi deictic speech and appeals to emotions) in dialectical argu ment and decision-making, and we seek a means to incor porate such devices in the Agora. This would not be novel: the argumentation system of Reed ( 1998) , for example, al lows for the modeling of rhetorical devices, although in a monolectical context. Secondly, using the Agora in a de liberative context would require incorporation of values for the projected consequences and the development of an ap propriate qualitative decision-theory, as in (Fox & Parsons 1998; Parsons & Green 1999) .
We believe the Risk Agora has a number of potential bene fits. Firstly, by articulating precisely the arguments used to assert carcinogenicity, gaps in knowledge and weaknesses in arguments can be identified more readily. Such iden tification could be used to prioritize bio-medical research efforts for the particular chemical. Secondly, by explor ing the logical consequences of claims, the Risk Agora can serve a social maieutic function, making explicit knowl edge which may only be latent. Thirdly, once instantiated with the details of a particular debate, the system could be used for self-education by others outside the scientific community concerned. Indeed, it could potentially form the basis for the making of regulatory or societal deci sions on the issues in question (e.g. Should the chemical be banned?) , and thereby give practical effect to notions of deliberative democracy (McBurney & Parsons 2000a; In press). Finally, with argumentation increasingly being used in the design of multi-agent systems (Parsons, Sierra, & Jennings 1998) , the formalism presented here could readily be adapted for deliberative dialogues between independent software agents.
